ICICI Prudential · Long Duration

ICICI Prudential Long Term Bond Fund-

Debt Scheme - Long Duration Fund Growth plan, growth riskometer: Moderate benchmark: CRISIL Long Duration Debt A-III Index launched 11 Dec 2012 open-ended

At a glance

the fund as it stands today, from public disclosures

NAV, 24 Apr 2020

₹73.54

+1.47% since 31 Mar 2020

1 year

16.4%

return

3 years

9.5%

a year

5 years

9.6%

a year

Since launch

10.3%

a year, over 5.6 years

Assets (AUM)

₹853 Cr

Jul 2026 factsheet

Expense ratio, Direct / Regular

0.37% / 0.81%

a year, as of Jul 2026

Holdings

top ten are 87% of the fund · Jul 2026

Disclosed history

7.8 yrs

Jun 2018 – Jul 2026 · 3 of 11 checks could run

Fund managers

Manish Banthia · since Jan 2024Raunak Surana · since Jan 2024

All managers →

What only Anveshan can tell you

measured from the disclosures, not quoted from a brochure — each links to how it was done

P5Cost, measured

Cannot be measured: needs both a Direct and a Regular growth class.

The Regular and Direct plans hold the same portfolio; the Regular one pays a distributor out of your money every day. The gap between the two NAVs is that cost, measured from the NAVs rather than quoted from a document.

See how it is measured →

P7Whose record

Run by Manish Banthia for 2.6 yrs

with Raunak Surana. A return earned before they arrived is the house's record, not theirs — the tenure table shows the fund against its category over exactly their months.

Manish Banthia's other funds →

NAVTracking gap

Not replicated: the portfolio cannot be priced line by line in this build.

Each day, the NAV the fund published against the NAV its last disclosed portfolio would have produced at that day's prices. A gap that opens and stays is a change the fund has made and not disclosed yet.

See the daily gap →

P4Consistency

Not measurable yet: needs three years of NAV and a category median.

Take every three-year stretch since the fund had a NAV, one starting each month, and ask two things of each: did it beat the typical fund in its category, and by how much. Counting the wins tells you the record does not depend on when you happen to look; averaging the margin tells you whether winning often was worth anything, because four small wins do not pay for one large loss.

See every window →

headline and record disagree One check found the headline number and the underlying record pointing different ways — marked on the cards below.

NAV and drawdown

Growth plan, growth class · as of 24 Apr 2020

Month-end NAV, indexed to 100 at Sep 2014

68 month-ends · ₹42.50 → ₹73.54, 1.7× since Sep 2014

Deepest fall (max drawdown)

not computed

Worst month

not computed

Days to recover

not computed

from the deepest trough back to the old high

Drawdown is measured on the last year of daily NAV; trailing returns are CAGR of the unknown growth class. A single end date decides them — the consistency card (P4) below is the record that does not, and it reports both how often the fund beat its category and by how much, because the first without the second can point the wrong way.

Holdings

Jul 2026 disclosure · 21 lines · when each was first held and the change over the last three disclosures

#	Holding	Sector	Weight	First held	Held for	3-mo change
11	State Government of Andhra Pradesh government security	—	2.36%	Sep 2025	11 mo	-0.20%
12	State Government of Maharashtra government security	—	2.34%	Jul 2025	1.1 yrs	+0.06%
13	State Government of Madhya Pradesh government security	—	2.10%	Sep 2025	11 mo	+0.06%
14	TREPS / cash equivalents TREPS · money market	—	1.83%	Jan 2019	7.6 yrs	-0.23%
15	Net Current Assets cash equivalent	—	1.81%	Jun 2018	8.2 yrs	+2.38%
16	State Government of Bihar government security	—	1.01%	Sep 2025	11 mo	+0.02%
17	State Government of Haryana government security	—	0.81%	Sep 2025	11 mo	+0.02%
18	State Government of West Bengal government security	—	0.67%	Mar 2025	1.4 yrs	+0.02%
19	Corporate Debt Market Development Fund (Class A2) structured product	—	0.40%	Oct 2023	2.8 yrs	+0.01%
20	Government Securities government security	—	0.04%	Aug 2025	1.0 yrs	-1.13%

Showing 11–20 of 21 · page 2 of 3 rows per page1025 50 all

Largest sectors, latest disclosure

Not yet computable. Sector labels come from the disclosures; none were mapped for this fund.

By market cap, latest disclosure

Not yet computable. Needs cap tiers for every holding.

The seven checks, in full

each: the plain claim, where it sits in the category, and — folded — how it is measured and the case against. A flag fires only where headline and record disagree.

P4 Consistency, not a single end date

Not measurable yet. Needs at least three years of month-end NAV and a category median; not computed for this fund yet.

What this means. Take every three-year stretch since the fund had a NAV, one starting each month, and ask two things of each: did it beat the typical fund in its category, and by how much. Counting the wins tells you the record does not depend on when you happen to look; averaging the margin tells you whether winning often was worth anything, because four small wins do not pay for one large loss.

How it is measured, and the case against

A fund that beats its category in most rolling three-year windows has a record; one that beats it in a few has an end date. How often it won and by how much are different questions, and this card answers both, because a fund can win four windows in five and still be behind across all five.

How often has it beaten its category, across every window?

Why this might matterRolling every three-year window forward month by month gives hundreds of overlapping observations instead of one. A single end date decides a headline five-year figure; the share of windows won cannot be flattered by when you happen to look. The average margin across every window is that share and the payoff multiplied together — win share x average beat plus loss share x average shortfall is exactly the average — so a high share bought with a few ruinous windows cannot hide behind the count.

Why it might notRolling windows overlap heavily, so they are not independent observations and the true sample is far smaller than the count suggests — the card says how many non-overlapping windows the same span holds, and it is usually a handful. A fund that changed manager or mandate carries a record that is only partly its own. The average margin is only as meaningful as the category: where a category is a grab bag (“Other ETFs” holds gold beside equity), a large shortfall says the comparison is wrong, not that the fund is. And none of this forecasts: our own study found the share of windows won does not predict the next three years, and weighting it by payoff gives no reason to think otherwise.

P5 Cost, measured

Not measurable yet. Needs a Direct and a Regular growth class with overlapping NAV history.

What this means. The Regular and Direct plans hold the same portfolio; the Regular one pays a distributor out of your money every day. The gap between the two NAVs is that cost, measured from the NAVs rather than quoted from a document.

How it is measured, and the case against

The Direct plan is the same portfolio, priced differently; the divergence of the two NAVs is the cost, measured rather than quoted.

What does the Regular plan actually cost against its Direct twin?

Why this might matterSame manager, same holdings, same day. The gap between the two NAV series is the one number on this page that is knowable today rather than hoped for, and it compounds for as long as the units are held.

Why it might notA Regular plan buys advice. If that advice stops someone selling in a drawdown it can be worth more than the fee — the cost is visible and the behavioural saving is not, which makes this comparison unfair in exactly one direction.

P1 Churn, and what it bought

Not measurable yet. Needs at least two consecutive monthly disclosures.

What this means. How much of the portfolio was bought and sold in a year, computed from what the fund disclosed each month. Trading costs something certain; the extra return it is meant to buy is not.

How it is measured, and the case against

Turnover measured from consecutive disclosures — Σ|Δweight|/2 — costs something certain; the excess return it is meant to buy is not.

Is the trading paying for itself?

Why this might matterAMCs define their own turnover figure inconsistently. This one is computed from what the fund disclosed month to month, so two funds are comparable on it. Read it beside the excess return per unit of turnover.

Why it might notTurnover computed from month-end snapshots misses everything bought and sold inside a month, and a fund forced to sell by redemptions is charged for churn it did not choose.

P2 Conviction or inertia

Not measurable yet. Needs the holdings history for this fund; not computed yet.

What this means. How long a typical top-10 position has been in the top ten. Long-held positions are a decision; a top ten that changes every quarter is a reaction.

How it is measured, and the case against

The median months a top-10 position has been held separates a portfolio somebody chose from one that drifted.

How long does a top-10 position stay a top-10 position?

Why this might matterConcentration is how a manager expresses conviction, and persistence is how long they keep it. Long-held positions with a rising weight are a decision; a top ten that turns over every quarter is a reaction.

Why it might notPersistence without active share is inertia: a portfolio of 166 names that tracks its category closely has diversified away the reason to pay for it. Active share needs index constituent files, which are not loaded yet.

P3 Hit rate of the top ten

Not measurable yet. Detector not yet written: needs each disclosure's top ten joined to six months of forward prices. Holdings and prices are in hand.

What this means. Take each month's ten largest holdings and check whether each one beat the typical stock its category holds over the next six months, and by how much. A blended return can hide two wins and eight losses; a count of wins can hide one position that lost half its value.

How it is measured, and the case against

A manager's largest bets, judged one by one over the following six months, say more than the fund's blended return — and how far each one beat or missed the median stock says more than counting how many did.

Of its top-10 positions, how often did they beat the category-median stock?

Why this might matterA fund can beat its category on two positions and lose on eight; the hit rate shows the pattern the aggregate hides. The average margin then shows what the hit rate hides in turn: six winners worth a point each do not pay for four losers worth ten, and only the margin says which happened.

Why it might notSix months is short, sizing matters more than counting, and a manager who is right on the biggest position and wrong on nine small ones has done their job — the margins here are unweighted, so they answer the counting question better, not the sizing one. Overlapping disclosures judge the same position again each month it is held, so one long-held winner is counted many times. And this is a description of six months already past, not a forecast of the next six.

P6 Size against edge

₹853 Cr

Regular plan expense ratio 0.94% a year

What this means. Where the fund sits by size in its category, and how much of its growth was money arriving rather than the portfolio compounding. A very large fund cannot buy what a small one can; size should buy a lower fee in return.

No category distribution for this measure yet.

expense ratio, Regular / Direct0.94% / 0.43%AUM, Aug 2023 → Jul 2026₹661 Cr → ₹853 Cr (+9% a year)

Assets under management, ₹ crore, Jun 2010 – Jul 2026

106 points · months without a factsheet figure use AMFI's quarterly average · Regular-plan expense ratio 1.70% in Jun 2018 → 0.94% in Aug 2026

How it is measured, and the case against

Past a certain size the smaller end of a mandate becomes unreachable, and the fund starts to look like its index; what size should buy in return is a lower expense ratio.

Has the fund outgrown the universe it invests in — and did size buy a lower fee?

Why this might matterSize narrows what the manager can meaningfully hold and should lower what the investor pays. Read the AUM history beside the expense ratio: a fund that has tripled through inflows while its Regular-plan TER sits above the category median has kept the benefit of scale for the house. The flow decomposition says how much of the growth was money arriving rather than the portfolio compounding.

Why it might notScale funds research teams, and plenty of large funds have gone on compounding for decades. Inflows follow performance, so a fund growing fast is usually one that did well; the constraint is real but not automatically binding, and a TER is a ceiling the AMC can cut at any time.

P7 Whose record is this headline and record disagree

Run by Manish Banthia for 2.6 yrs

with Raunak Surana

What this means. How long the people running it now have been running it, read from the monthly factsheets. A five-year record earned under someone else is not evidence about these managers.

No category distribution for this measure yet.

running it nowManish Banthia (since Jan 2024), Raunak Surana (since Jan 2024)share of the fund's life under the longest-serving current manager19%changes of hands in the archive3 — last Jan 2024

Who ran it, month by month · factsheets through Aug 2026

running it nowearlier

Manager	Role	From	To	Fund vs category, those months	3-yr stretches won in tenure
Manish Banthia	fund manager	Jan 2024	now	—	—
Raunak Surana	fund manager	Jan 2024	now	—	—
Manish Banthia	fund manager	Sep 2013	Apr 2023	—	—
Anuj Tagra	fund manager	Dec 2020	Dec 2023	—	—
Rohit Lakhotia	fund manager	May 2023	Dec 2023	—	—

* dated by first appearance in the archive we hold, not by a date the factsheet printed. Co-managed months count for every manager named; a factsheet names the manager of record, not who made each call. All managers →

The 5-year record predates everyone currently running it. The longest-serving manager on this scheme has been in place about 2.7 years, against a 5-year figure on display. Manish Banthia joined roughly 2.7 years ago. A record earned under different people is not evidence about these ones.

How it is measured, and the case against

A record earned under different people is not evidence about these ones.

Does the displayed record predate the people running it?

Why this might matterA five-year figure on a fund whose longest-serving manager joined two years ago is the house's record more than the person's. The tenure here comes from what each monthly factsheet named, so a change of hands is dated to the month it was disclosed, and the fund's return against its category can be read over exactly those months.

Why it might notFund houses have processes, research desks and mandates that outlast individuals, so a manager change is not a reset. It does mean the displayed record is the house’s more than the person’s.

Tracking gap

the NAV the fund published, against the NAV its last disclosed portfolio would have produced at each day's prices

No signal. About 100% of this fund is outside listed Indian equity — a foreign or derivative sleeve, or debt — and there are no daily prices to replicate it with. A wrong signal would be worse than none.

Share classes

latest NAV per AMFI code

Plan	Option	NAV	Date
— ICICI Prudential Long Term Bond Fund-Institutional Option-Growth	growth	₹73.54	24 Apr 2020
— ICICI Prudential Long Term Bond Fund - Institutional Dividend Halfyearly	idcw	₹10.85	24 Apr 2020

The Direct / Regular gap, in rupees

This fund does not have both a Direct and a Regular growth class in the data, so the gap cannot be measured.

A Regular plan buys advice. The fee is visible and the behavioural saving is not; both are shown, neither is netted off.

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