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ICICI Prudential · Growth

ICICI Prudential Bharat Consumption Fund - Series 4

Growth Direct plan, growth launched 30 Jul 2018 close-ended

At a glance

the fund as it stands today, from public disclosures

NAV, 11 Mar 2022
₹15.13
−2.26% since 28 Feb 2022
1 year
22.1%
return
3 years
16.5%
a year
5 years
not enough history
Since launch
12.3%
a year, over 3.5 years
Assets (AUM)
₹481 Cr
Mar 2022 AMFI quarterly average
Expense ratio, Direct / Regular
0.97% / 1.39%
a year, as of Mar 2022
Holdings
20
top ten are 90% of the fund · Feb 2022
Disclosed history
3.3 yrs
Aug 2018 – Feb 2022 · 3 of 11 checks could run
Fund managers
not parsed from the factsheets yet

What only Anveshan can tell you

measured from the disclosures, not quoted from a brochure — each links to how it was done

P5Cost, measured

Regular plan costs 0.77% a year more than Direct

₹20,937 on ₹1 lakh over ten years. Same portfolio, two prices — the difference is what the Regular plan's distribution costs you, read from the two NAVs.

See how it is measured →
P7Whose record

Not known yet: no factsheet named a manager for this fund.

How long the people running it now have been running it, read from the monthly factsheets. A five-year record earned under someone else is not evidence about these managers.

See what is missing →
NAVTracking gap

Not replicated: the portfolio cannot be priced line by line in this build.

Each day, the NAV the fund published against the NAV its last disclosed portfolio would have produced at that day's prices. A gap that opens and stays is a change the fund has made and not disclosed yet.

See the daily gap →
P4Consistency

Beat its category in 29% of three-year stretches, yet averaged +0.1 points a year across all of them

7 rolling windows since 2018 · ahead by 0.7 points a year when it won, behind by 0.2 when it lost. A single five-year figure depends on the day you look; the share of stretches won does not — and the average margin says whether winning often was worth anything.

See every window →

NAV and drawdown

Direct plan, growth class · as of 11 Mar 2022

Month-end NAV, indexed to 100 at Aug 2018

100125150Aug 2018Jul 2019Jun 2020May 2021Mar 2022Aug 2018: NAV ₹10.05Sep 2018: NAV ₹9.50Oct 2018: NAV ₹9.36Nov 2018: NAV ₹9.77Dec 2018: NAV ₹9.93Jan 2019: NAV ₹9.56Feb 2019: NAV ₹9.53Mar 2019: NAV ₹9.87Apr 2019: NAV ₹9.92May 2019: NAV ₹9.85Jun 2019: NAV ₹9.79Jul 2019: NAV ₹9.21Aug 2019: NAV ₹9.51Sep 2019: NAV ₹10.32Oct 2019: NAV ₹10.86Nov 2019: NAV ₹10.59Dec 2019: NAV ₹10.65Jan 2020: NAV ₹10.84Feb 2020: NAV ₹10.61Mar 2020: NAV ₹8.46Apr 2020: NAV ₹9.13May 2020: NAV ₹9.12Jun 2020: NAV ₹9.57Jul 2020: NAV ₹9.75Aug 2020: NAV ₹10.30Sep 2020: NAV ₹10.23Oct 2020: NAV ₹10.22Nov 2020: NAV ₹11.19Dec 2020: NAV ₹12.12Jan 2021: NAV ₹12.05Feb 2021: NAV ₹12.30Mar 2021: NAV ₹12.47Apr 2021: NAV ₹12.33May 2021: NAV ₹13.13Jun 2021: NAV ₹13.47Jul 2021: NAV ₹13.76Aug 2021: NAV ₹14.46Sep 2021: NAV ₹15.22Oct 2021: NAV ₹15.65Nov 2021: NAV ₹15.41Dec 2021: NAV ₹15.47Jan 2022: NAV ₹15.60Feb 2022: NAV ₹15.48Mar 2022: NAV ₹15.13
100125150Aug 2018Jul 2019Jun 2020May 2021Mar 2022Aug 2018: NAV ₹10.05Sep 2018: NAV ₹9.50Oct 2018: NAV ₹9.36Nov 2018: NAV ₹9.77Dec 2018: NAV ₹9.93Jan 2019: NAV ₹9.56Feb 2019: NAV ₹9.53Mar 2019: NAV ₹9.87Apr 2019: NAV ₹9.92May 2019: NAV ₹9.85Jun 2019: NAV ₹9.79Jul 2019: NAV ₹9.21Aug 2019: NAV ₹9.51Sep 2019: NAV ₹10.32Oct 2019: NAV ₹10.86Nov 2019: NAV ₹10.59Dec 2019: NAV ₹10.65Jan 2020: NAV ₹10.84Feb 2020: NAV ₹10.61Mar 2020: NAV ₹8.46Apr 2020: NAV ₹9.13May 2020: NAV ₹9.12Jun 2020: NAV ₹9.57Jul 2020: NAV ₹9.75Aug 2020: NAV ₹10.30Sep 2020: NAV ₹10.23Oct 2020: NAV ₹10.22Nov 2020: NAV ₹11.19Dec 2020: NAV ₹12.12Jan 2021: NAV ₹12.05Feb 2021: NAV ₹12.30Mar 2021: NAV ₹12.47Apr 2021: NAV ₹12.33May 2021: NAV ₹13.13Jun 2021: NAV ₹13.47Jul 2021: NAV ₹13.76Aug 2021: NAV ₹14.46Sep 2021: NAV ₹15.22Oct 2021: NAV ₹15.65Nov 2021: NAV ₹15.41Dec 2021: NAV ₹15.47Jan 2022: NAV ₹15.60Feb 2022: NAV ₹15.48Mar 2022: NAV ₹15.13
100125150Aug 2018Jul 2019Jun 2020May 2021Mar 2022Aug 2018: NAV ₹10.05Sep 2018: NAV ₹9.50Oct 2018: NAV ₹9.36Nov 2018: NAV ₹9.77Dec 2018: NAV ₹9.93Jan 2019: NAV ₹9.56Feb 2019: NAV ₹9.53Mar 2019: NAV ₹9.87Apr 2019: NAV ₹9.92May 2019: NAV ₹9.85Jun 2019: NAV ₹9.79Jul 2019: NAV ₹9.21Aug 2019: NAV ₹9.51Sep 2019: NAV ₹10.32Oct 2019: NAV ₹10.86Nov 2019: NAV ₹10.59Dec 2019: NAV ₹10.65Jan 2020: NAV ₹10.84Feb 2020: NAV ₹10.61Mar 2020: NAV ₹8.46Apr 2020: NAV ₹9.13May 2020: NAV ₹9.12Jun 2020: NAV ₹9.57Jul 2020: NAV ₹9.75Aug 2020: NAV ₹10.30Sep 2020: NAV ₹10.23Oct 2020: NAV ₹10.22Nov 2020: NAV ₹11.19Dec 2020: NAV ₹12.12Jan 2021: NAV ₹12.05Feb 2021: NAV ₹12.30Mar 2021: NAV ₹12.47Apr 2021: NAV ₹12.33May 2021: NAV ₹13.13Jun 2021: NAV ₹13.47Jul 2021: NAV ₹13.76Aug 2021: NAV ₹14.46Sep 2021: NAV ₹15.22Oct 2021: NAV ₹15.65Nov 2021: NAV ₹15.41Dec 2021: NAV ₹15.47Jan 2022: NAV ₹15.60Feb 2022: NAV ₹15.48Mar 2022: NAV ₹15.13

44 month-ends · ₹10.05 → ₹15.13, 1.5× since Aug 2018

Deepest fall (max drawdown)
not computed
Worst month
not computed
Days to recover
not computed
from the deepest trough back to the old high

Drawdown is measured on the last year of daily NAV; trailing returns are CAGR of the direct growth class. A single end date decides them — the consistency card (P4) below is the record that does not, and it reports both how often the fund beat its category and by how much, because the first without the second can point the wrong way.

Holdings

Feb 2022 disclosure · 20 lines · when each was first held and the change over the last three disclosures

#HoldingSectorWeightFirst heldHeld for3-mo change
1 TREPS / cash equivalents
TREPS · money market
— 47.22% Dec 2018 3.3 yrs +28.73%
2 Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.
equity
Auto 7.26% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs -1.37%
3 Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
equity
Auto 6.68% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs +0.88%
4 ITC Ltd.
equity
Consumer Non Durables 5.90% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs +3.27%
5 Bharti Airtel Ltd.
equity
Telecom - Services 5.68% May 2019 2.8 yrs -3.70%
6 Britannia Industries Ltd.
equity
Consumer Non Durables 4.93% Nov 2018 3.3 yrs -0.18%
7 Hindustan Unilever Ltd.
equity
Consumer Non Durables 3.74% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs +0.42%
8 Avenue Supermarts Ltd.
equity
Retailing 3.21% Oct 2018 3.4 yrs -3.90%
9 91 Days Treasury Bills
government security
— 3.21% Jan 2022 2 mo +3.21%
10 Titan Company Ltd.
equity
Consumer Durables 2.57% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs -4.49%
11 91 Days Treasury Bills
government security
— 2.41% Feb 2022 1 mo +2.41%
12 Asian Paints Ltd.
equity
Consumer Non Durables 2.31% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs -0.91%
13 TVS Motor Company Ltd.
equity
Auto 2.01% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs -6.42%
14 182 Days Treasury Bills
government security
— 1.60% Feb 2022 1 mo +1.60%
15 TREPS / cash equivalents
Cash Margin - Derivatives · cash equivalent
— 0.41% Jan 2022 2 mo +0.41%
16 Nestle India Ltd.
equity
Consumer Non Durables 0.31% May 2020 1.8 yrs -1.49%
17 Net Current Assets
cash equivalent
— 0.29% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs +0.24%
18 The Phoenix Mills Ltd.
equity
Construction 0.11% Nov 2021 4 mo -0.00%
19 Voltas Ltd.
equity
Consumer Durables 0.09% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs -1.93%
20 PVR Ltd.
equity
Entertainment 0.06% Aug 2018 3.6 yrs -4.60%
Showing 1–20 of 20 rows per page102550all

Largest sectors, Feb 2022 · grey: a year ago

Consumer Non Durables17.2% · 28.0%
Auto16.0% · 23.5%
Telecom - Services5.7% · 9.0%
Retailing3.2% · 7.4%
Consumer Durables2.7% · 14.3%
Construction0.1%
Entertainment0.1%
share of the book05%10%15%20%

By market cap, Feb 2022

Large cap44.3%
Mid cap0.2%
Small / micro cap0.1%
Cash & equivalents47.9%
Not classified0.3%
Other7.2%
share of the book025%50%75%100%

"Not classified" is what no cap tier could be inferred for — newly listed names, or lines without an ISIN.

Composition by market cap, month by month — what the fund actually held against what its label says

Large cap: 51% → 44%Mid cap: 2% → 0%Small / micro: 5% → 0%Cash & other: 22% → 48%25%50%75%Aug 2018Aug 2020Feb 2022
Large cap: 51% → 44%Mid cap: 2% → 0%Small / micro: 5% → 0%Cash & other: 22% → 48%25%50%75%Large cap 44%Mid cap 0%Small / micro 0%Cash & other 48%Aug 2018Aug 2020Feb 2022
Large cap: 51% → 44%Mid cap: 2% → 0%Small / micro: 5% → 0%Cash & other: 22% → 48%25%50%75%Large cap 44%Mid cap 0%Small / micro 0%Cash & other 48%Aug 2018Aug 2020Feb 2022
  • Large cap 44%
  • Mid cap 0%
  • Small / micro 0%
  • Cash & other 48%

The seven checks, in full

each: the plain claim, where it sits in the category, and — folded — how it is measured and the case against. A flag fires only where headline and record disagree.

P4 Consistency, not a single end date

Beat its category in 29% of three-year stretches, yet averaged +0.1 points a year across all of them

7 rolling windows since 2018 · ahead by 0.7 points a year when it won, behind by 0.2 when it lost

What this means. Take every three-year stretch since the fund had a NAV, one starting each month, and ask two things of each: did it beat the typical fund in its category, and by how much. Counting the wins tells you the record does not depend on when you happen to look; averaging the margin tells you whether winning often was worth anything, because four small wins do not pay for one large loss.

How often, and by how much. It lost more windows than it won, but the wins were bigger. Ahead by 0.7 points a year in the 2 windows it won and behind by 0.2 in the 5 it lost, so the average across all 7 is +0.1 points. The worst window ended Dec 2021, 0.4 points behind. Counting windows makes this fund look worse than the arithmetic does.

No category distribution for this measure yet.
windows measured7windows won2average across every window+0.06 pts a year · median −0.12when ahead, by how much+0.66 pts a year over 2 windowswhen behind, by how much−0.18 pts a year over 5 windowsworst window−0.39 pts a year, ended Dec 2021best window+1.15 pts a year, ended Oct 2021non-overlapping windows in that span1 — the rolling count overlaps, this does not
Thin record. Only 7 rolling windows — under six years of NAV. The share is shown because it was measured; it is a start, not a record, and does not qualify for the home shelf until 36 windows exist.

Fund minus category, each rolling three-year window

-1.2 pp0.0 pp+1.2 ppAug 2021: fund 12.9% vs category 13.0% (3-year CAGR)Sep 2021: fund 17.0% vs category 17.2% (3-year CAGR)Oct 2021: fund 18.7% vs category 17.5% (3-year CAGR)Nov 2021: fund 16.4% vs category 16.2% (3-year CAGR)Dec 2021: fund 15.9% vs category 16.3% (3-year CAGR)Jan 2022: fund 17.7% vs category 17.9% (3-year CAGR)Feb 2022: fund 17.6% vs category 17.7% (3-year CAGR)Aug 2021Dec 2021Feb 2022
-1.2 pp0.0 pp+1.2 ppAug 2021: fund 12.9% vs category 13.0% (3-year CAGR)Sep 2021: fund 17.0% vs category 17.2% (3-year CAGR)Oct 2021: fund 18.7% vs category 17.5% (3-year CAGR)Nov 2021: fund 16.4% vs category 16.2% (3-year CAGR)Dec 2021: fund 15.9% vs category 16.3% (3-year CAGR)Jan 2022: fund 17.7% vs category 17.9% (3-year CAGR)Feb 2022: fund 17.6% vs category 17.7% (3-year CAGR)Aug 2021Dec 2021Feb 2022
-1.2 pp0.0 pp+1.2 ppAug 2021: fund 12.9% vs category 13.0% (3-year CAGR)Sep 2021: fund 17.0% vs category 17.2% (3-year CAGR)Oct 2021: fund 18.7% vs category 17.5% (3-year CAGR)Nov 2021: fund 16.4% vs category 16.2% (3-year CAGR)Dec 2021: fund 15.9% vs category 16.3% (3-year CAGR)Jan 2022: fund 17.7% vs category 17.9% (3-year CAGR)Feb 2022: fund 17.6% vs category 17.7% (3-year CAGR)Aug 2021Dec 2021Feb 2022
ahead of categorybehind

Each bar is one window's margin in percentage points a year. The height of the bars, not the count of green ones, is what the average across every window measures.

How it is measured, and the case against

A fund that beats its category in most rolling three-year windows has a record; one that beats it in a few has an end date. How often it won and by how much are different questions, and this card answers both, because a fund can win four windows in five and still be behind across all five.

How often has it beaten its category, across every window?

Why this might matterRolling every three-year window forward month by month gives hundreds of overlapping observations instead of one. A single end date decides a headline five-year figure; the share of windows won cannot be flattered by when you happen to look. The average margin across every window is that share and the payoff multiplied together — win share x average beat plus loss share x average shortfall is exactly the average — so a high share bought with a few ruinous windows cannot hide behind the count.
Why it might notRolling windows overlap heavily, so they are not independent observations and the true sample is far smaller than the count suggests — the card says how many non-overlapping windows the same span holds, and it is usually a handful. A fund that changed manager or mandate carries a record that is only partly its own. The average margin is only as meaningful as the category: where a category is a grab bag (“Other ETFs” holds gold beside equity), a large shortfall says the comparison is wrong, not that the fund is. And none of this forecasts: our own study found the share of windows won does not predict the next three years, and weighting it by payoff gives no reason to think otherwise.
P5 Cost, measured

Regular plan costs 0.77% a year more than Direct

₹20,937 on ₹1 lakh over ten years

What this means. The Regular and Direct plans hold the same portfolio; the Regular one pays a distributor out of your money every day. The gap between the two NAVs is that cost, measured from the NAVs rather than quoted from a document.

No category distribution for this measure yet.
on ₹1,00,000 over ten years₹20,937Direct vs Regular, annualised12.1% vs 11.3%measured over3.58 years
How it is measured, and the case against

The Direct plan is the same portfolio, priced differently; the divergence of the two NAVs is the cost, measured rather than quoted.

What does the Regular plan actually cost against its Direct twin?

Why this might matterSame manager, same holdings, same day. The gap between the two NAV series is the one number on this page that is knowable today rather than hoped for, and it compounds for as long as the units are held.
Why it might notA Regular plan buys advice. If that advice stops someone selling in a drawdown it can be worth more than the fee — the cost is visible and the behavioural saving is not, which makes this comparison unfair in exactly one direction.
P1 Churn, and what it bought

Turns over 91% of the portfolio a year

What this means. How much of the portfolio was bought and sold in a year, computed from what the fund disclosed each month. Trading costs something certain; the extra return it is meant to buy is not.

No category distribution for this measure yet.
excess return per unit of turnoverneeds the category 1-year median — not computed yet
How it is measured, and the case against

Turnover measured from consecutive disclosures — Σ|Δweight|/2 — costs something certain; the excess return it is meant to buy is not.

Is the trading paying for itself?

Why this might matterAMCs define their own turnover figure inconsistently. This one is computed from what the fund disclosed month to month, so two funds are comparable on it. Read it beside the excess return per unit of turnover.
Why it might notTurnover computed from month-end snapshots misses everything bought and sold inside a month, and a fund forced to sell by redemptions is charged for churn it did not choose.
P2 Conviction or inertia

Typical top-10 holding kept 43 months

What this means. How long a typical top-10 position has been in the top ten. Long-held positions are a decision; a top ten that changes every quarter is a reaction.

No category distribution for this measure yet.
active sharenot yet computable — needs index constituent files
How it is measured, and the case against

The median months a top-10 position has been held separates a portfolio somebody chose from one that drifted.

How long does a top-10 position stay a top-10 position?

Why this might matterConcentration is how a manager expresses conviction, and persistence is how long they keep it. Long-held positions with a rising weight are a decision; a top ten that turns over every quarter is a reaction.
Why it might notPersistence without active share is inertia: a portfolio of 166 names that tracks its category closely has diversified away the reason to pay for it. Active share needs index constituent files, which are not loaded yet.
P3 Hit rate of the top ten

5 of 10 top picks beat their peers over the next 6 months, and averaged 1.6 points behind them

380 positions judged, one disclosure at a time · ahead by 15.9 points when it won, behind by 16.4 when it lost

What this means. Take each month's ten largest holdings and check whether each one beat the typical stock its category holds over the next six months, and by how much. A blended return can hide two wins and eight losses; a count of wins can hide one position that lost half its value.

How often, and by how much. The count and the average agree. Ahead by 15.9 points in the 174 positions it won and behind by 16.4 in the 206 it lost, so the average across all 380 is −1.6 points. The worst position was INE397D01024 at the May 2020 disclosure, 55.3 points behind.

No category distribution for this measure yet.
positions judged380beat the median stock174average across every position−1.58 pts · median −1.70when ahead, by how much+15.89 pts over 174 positionswhen behind, by how much−16.42 pts over 206 positionsworst position−55.34 pts, INE397D01024 at the May 2020 disclosurebest position+77.37 pts, INE775A01035 at the Aug 2020 disclosure
How it is measured, and the case against

A manager's largest bets, judged one by one over the following six months, say more than the fund's blended return — and how far each one beat or missed the median stock says more than counting how many did.

Of its top-10 positions, how often did they beat the category-median stock?

Why this might matterA fund can beat its category on two positions and lose on eight; the hit rate shows the pattern the aggregate hides. The average margin then shows what the hit rate hides in turn: six winners worth a point each do not pay for four losers worth ten, and only the margin says which happened.
Why it might notSix months is short, sizing matters more than counting, and a manager who is right on the biggest position and wrong on nine small ones has done their job — the margins here are unweighted, so they answer the counting question better, not the sizing one. Overlapping disclosures judge the same position again each month it is held, so one long-held winner is counted many times. And this is a description of six months already past, not a forecast of the next six.
P6 Size against edge

₹481 Cr; 147% of growth came from outflows

Regular plan expense ratio 1.39% a year

What this means. Where the fund sits by size in its category, and how much of its growth was money arriving rather than the portfolio compounding. A very large fund cannot buy what a small one can; size should buy a lower fee in return.

No category distribution for this measure yet.
expense ratio, Regular / Direct1.39% / 0.97% · category median 1.42%AUM, Mar 2019 → Mar 2022₹396 Cr → ₹481 Cr (+7% a year)of that change, from flows rather than returns147% net outflows · NAV +53% over the window

Assets under management, ₹ crore, Sep 2018 – Mar 2022

200400600Sep 2018Sep 2019Sep 2020Jun 2021Mar 2022Sep 2018: ₹186 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2018: ₹392 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2019: ₹396 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2019: ₹402 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2019: ₹388 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2019: ₹428 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2020: ₹421 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2020: ₹364 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2020: ₹411 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2020: ₹446 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2021: ₹508 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2021: ₹518 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2021: ₹572 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2021: ₹633 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2022: ₹481 Cr (amfi-aaum)
200400600Sep 2018Sep 2019Sep 2020Jun 2021Mar 2022Sep 2018: ₹186 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2018: ₹392 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2019: ₹396 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2019: ₹402 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2019: ₹388 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2019: ₹428 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2020: ₹421 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2020: ₹364 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2020: ₹411 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2020: ₹446 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2021: ₹508 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2021: ₹518 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2021: ₹572 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2021: ₹633 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2022: ₹481 Cr (amfi-aaum)
200400600Sep 2018Sep 2019Sep 2020Jun 2021Mar 2022Sep 2018: ₹186 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2018: ₹392 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2019: ₹396 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2019: ₹402 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2019: ₹388 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2019: ₹428 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2020: ₹421 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2020: ₹364 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2020: ₹411 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2020: ₹446 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2021: ₹508 Cr (amfi-aaum)Jun 2021: ₹518 Cr (amfi-aaum)Sep 2021: ₹572 Cr (amfi-aaum)Dec 2021: ₹633 Cr (amfi-aaum)Mar 2022: ₹481 Cr (amfi-aaum)

15 points · months without a factsheet figure use AMFI's quarterly average · Regular-plan expense ratio 2.75% in Aug 2018 → 1.39% in Mar 2022

How it is measured, and the case against

Past a certain size the smaller end of a mandate becomes unreachable, and the fund starts to look like its index; what size should buy in return is a lower expense ratio.

Has the fund outgrown the universe it invests in — and did size buy a lower fee?

Why this might matterSize narrows what the manager can meaningfully hold and should lower what the investor pays. Read the AUM history beside the expense ratio: a fund that has tripled through inflows while its Regular-plan TER sits above the category median has kept the benefit of scale for the house. The flow decomposition says how much of the growth was money arriving rather than the portfolio compounding.
Why it might notScale funds research teams, and plenty of large funds have gone on compounding for decades. Inflows follow performance, so a fund growing fast is usually one that did well; the constraint is real but not automatically binding, and a TER is a ceiling the AMC can cut at any time.
P7 Whose record is this
Not measurable yet. Needs manager names from the monthly factsheet archive; none were parsed for this fund yet.

What this means. How long the people running it now have been running it, read from the monthly factsheets. A five-year record earned under someone else is not evidence about these managers.

How it is measured, and the case against

A record earned under different people is not evidence about these ones.

Does the displayed record predate the people running it?

Why this might matterA five-year figure on a fund whose longest-serving manager joined two years ago is the house's record more than the person's. The tenure here comes from what each monthly factsheet named, so a change of hands is dated to the month it was disclosed, and the fund's return against its category can be read over exactly those months.
Why it might notFund houses have processes, research desks and mandates that outlast individuals, so a manager change is not a reset. Co-managed funds attribute the same months to every named manager, and a factsheet names the manager of record, not necessarily the person making the calls.

Tracking gap

the NAV the fund published, against the NAV its last disclosed portfolio would have produced at each day's prices

No signal. About 55% of this fund is outside listed Indian equity — a foreign or derivative sleeve, or debt — and there are no daily prices to replicate it with. A wrong signal would be worse than none.

Share classes

latest NAV per AMFI code

PlanOptionNAVDate
direct
ICICI Prudential Bharat Consumption Fund - Series 4 - Direct Plan - Cumulative Option
growth₹15.1311 Mar 2022
direct
ICICI Prudential Bharat Consumption Fund - Series 4 - Direct Plan - IDCW Option
idcw₹15.1311 Mar 2022
regular
ICICI Prudential Bharat Consumption Fund - Series 4 - Cumulative Option
growth₹14.7611 Mar 2022
regular
ICICI Prudential Bharat Consumption Fund - Series 4 - IDCW Option
idcw₹14.7611 Mar 2022
The Direct / Regular gap, in rupees
Direct growth NAV
₹15.13
Regular growth NAV
₹14.76
NAV divergence to date
2.5% — same portfolio, priced differently
Regular costs more by
0.77% a year
On ₹1,00,000 over ten years
₹20,937

A Regular plan buys advice. The fee is visible and the behavioural saving is not; both are shown, neither is netted off.

Compare with

same category, by size